Risk is likelihood times threat.

So in a company the most likely person to be attacked is the one which has the highest threat i.e. there is little one can do with a person who has no authority. So the people with authority are the ones most at risk since threat is higher, thus Finance, HR, IT help, executive assistants and of course the executives themselves.

Finance/accounts payable, HR, IT help desk/support, and executive assistants (plus executives themselves) are the highest-risk “victims,” with every employee still a realistic target.⁠Breacher⁠Rivell

Social engineering works by exploiting authority, urgency, trust, and helpfulness rather than technical flaws. In practice (including red-team and incident data), these roles are hit hardest because they control money, identity data, or the ability to reset access:

  • Finance / AP / controllers: Immediate money movement (wire fraud, vendor bank-detail changes, invoice redirection). This is the classic Business Email Compromise (BEC) path and usually the costliest outcome.
  • HR: Payroll diversion, W-2/employee PII theft, benefits changes, and onboarding data. Attackers also use “HR” subject lines because people rarely ignore them.
  • IT help desk / support: Credential resets, MFA bypasses, and temporary access grants. A successful call or ticket can turn into full account takeover (this vector has driven major incidents).
  • Executive assistants and executives: Urgency + authority (“CEO needs this wire while traveling,” deepfake voice/video). Whaling and pretexting thrive here.
  • Everyone else: Broad phishing, smishing, and pretexting still succeed widely. Verizon DBIR data consistently shows the human element in roughly 60–74% of breaches; social engineering is a top pattern, and small businesses are frequently targeted precisely because processes are informal and training is thin. phishingbox.com

The smaller the business the more likely there is a likelihood and threat in a few people – the ones in charge:

In small businesses the risk is concentrated further: people wear multiple hats, verification steps get skipped under pressure, and one successful attack can be existential.

From Cisa.gov CISA is the government agency in Homeland security that helps businesses with cybersecurity:

Most important audience for the policy

Leadership (owners/CEO/senior managers) first, then every employee—with extra intensity on the high-risk roles above.

Culture and compliance start at the top. CISA’s small-business guidance is explicit that cybersecurity is cultural as much as technical, and culture cannot be delegated. If leaders do not model the behaviors, talk about them, enforce them, and personally push MFA or verification rules, staff will treat the policy as optional paperwork.⁠Cisa Once leadership owns it, the people who must internalize and practice the rules daily are the employees (especially finance, HR, help desk, and anyone who can move money or reset access).

If you think about it this makes sense, the people in charge of the controls whether it is finance, HR, or IT are the highest threat.

So what do we do to help the executives? Have to create a security policy and help with phishing training. I.e. test the users by sending them fake emails but in a controlled setting. If there is a failure then there is no issue except the user has to understand not to click on these emails.

Contact me to discuss.

By zafirt